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Abstract
One of the most energy-draining and frustrating parts
of software development is playing detective with elu-
sive bugs. In this paper we argue that automated post-
mortem debugging of failures is feasible for real, in-
production systems with no runtime recording. We pro-
pose reverse execution synthesis (RES), a technique that
takes a coredump obtained after a failure and automat-
ically computes the suffix of an execution that leads to
that coredump. RES provides a way to then play back
this suffix in a debugger deterministically, over and over
again. We argue that the RES approach could be used to
(1) automatically classify bug reports based on their root
cause, (2) automatically identify coredumps for which
hardware errors (e.g., bad memory), not software bugs
are to blame, and (3) ultimately help developers repro-
duce the root cause of the failure in order to debug it.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Debugging software deployed in the real world is hard,
frustrating, and typically requires deep knowledge of the
code. Bug reports rarely provide sufficient information,
so developers must turn into detectives in search of an
explanation of how the program could have reached the
reported failure state. It would be great if developers had
a better way to triage, analyze, and debug these failures.
One way to do this is deterministic record-replay:
record all key events during the real execution and, when
a failure occurs, ship the log of these events along with
the failure to the developers, who can then reproduce the
execution that led to the failure [2, 14, 15, 17, 19].
Record-replay systems, however, are not ideal, mainly
because of performance and storage overheads. For ex-
ample, making a multi-threaded execution on a multi-
core CPU reproducible requires logging a large num-
ber of memory operations, and this causes existing de-
terministic record-replay systems to have high perfor-
mance overhead (e.g., 400% for SMP-ReVirt [14] and
60% for ODR [2], even for a 2-core CPU). Several sys-
tems choose to trade some of the reproducibility guar-
antees for lower runtime overhead [2, 5, 23], but this
trade-off hurts their utility for debugging [27]. When
building a record-replay system for datacenter applica-
tions [28], a big challenge is that they are data-intensive,
and the large volume of data they process increases pro-
portionally with the size of the system and the power
of individual nodes. Recording all this data and storing
it for debugging purposes is impractical; checkpointing
can help trim the logs, but it increases recording over-
head and still does not get rid of logs. Since recording
must be always-on, to catch the occurrence of infrequent
bugs (which are the hard ones to debug), we believe such
performance and storage overheads make record-replay
impractical for debugging failures in production systems.
Another option would be to use deterministic execu-
tion systems [3, 4, 11, 12], but they too are prohibitively
heavyweight, especially for multi-CPU systems.
We set out to address the question of how would one
debug failures post-mortem with no runtime recording
and no execution control in production—once the appli-
cation fails, our ideal tool would use the information that
can be collected “for free” after the failure (e.g., the core-
dump) to automatically infer how to make the program
fail in the same way again, thus enabling developers to
home in on the root cause and fix it. This tool would
essentially automate what developers do manually today.
A fundamental challenge is that the coredump does not
contain enough information to reproduce the exact exe-
cution that led to the failure in the general case. However,
this is not really necessary: for debugging, it is sufficient
to produce some execution that reproduces the observed
failure state and the root cause [27]. The execution syn-
thesis technique [29] we proposed in the past accom-
plishes this by mimicking a human developer: it does
a backward analysis starting from the coredump, iden-
tifies in the space of possible execution paths some key
“reference points” that must be part of all failure-bound
executions, and then uses forward symbolic execution [9]
on the program to find a path that passes through the ref-
erence points and produces the coredump.
The problem, though, is that this approach does not
work for arbitrarily long executions—in fact, the longer
the execution, the more ambiguity in the location of these
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reference points, and the harder it becomes to synthesize
an execution all the way from the start of the execution
to the end failure state.
We advocate a new approach that turns execution syn-
thesis on its head; we call it reverse execution synthesis
(RES). The observation we leverage is that developers
do not really need a full execution from start to finish,
but just a suffix of the failure-bound execution—as long
as developers can replay this suffix and it contains the
root cause of the failure, it is sufficient to debug it [27].
In essence, RES reverse-executes the program and
reproduces the last few milliseconds of the execution,
enough to capture the root cause; the length of the full
execution is irrelevant to this approach. Unlike backward
static analysis (e.g., PSE [20]), RES’s analysis provides
an accurate execution suffix that can be run deterministi-
cally in a debugger. Unlike execution synthesis, RES in-
terprets the entire coredump, not just a minidump, which
makes RES strictly more powerful.
We now describe the technique in more detail (§2) and
present three possible use cases (§3): automatic classi-
fication of bug reports, automatic identification of fail-
ures likely caused by hardware errors (such as memory
bit flips or CPU bugs), and helping developers debug the
failed program.
2 Design of Reverse Execution Synthesis
We need a tool that, for a given program P, can use a
coredumpC to generate a suffix of a feasible execution E
that causes program P to produce coredumpC. The key
requirements are that (1) there is no recording at runtime;
(2) the technique works for multi-threaded programs and
concurrency bugs; (3) the suffix is of a feasible execu-
tion; (4) the suffix contains the root cause of the failure;
(5) execution E deterministically leads to C; and (6) no
modifications are to be made to P. This would make the
tool indeed useful for debugging failures that occur in
real-world production systems. Since it is predicated on
the presence of a coredump, this tool would work for
failures whose state can be snapshotted in a coredump
(e.g., crashes, deadlocks). Our current design for RES
meets requirements (1), (2), (5), (6), and aims to satisfy
but cannot always guarantee (3) and (4).
In proposing a technique for building such a tool, we
rely on two enablers: First, E does not need to be the
execution that actually occurred in production and led
to coredumpC—any execution that reproduces the same
root cause and failure is sufficient [27]. Second, we as-
sume that the root cause is located fairly close to the fail-
ure (e.g., 85% of the bugs analyzed in [30] were executed
just a few instructions before the failure), so we expect a
short execution suffix to suffice for debugging.
2.1 What Are the Inputs and Outputs?
Inputs: As suggested above, RES takes in the coredump
C that represents a snapshot of the failed program’s state;
this is typically a free by-product of a failed execution
and is already being collected by production systems [16,
25]. In addition to C, RES takes in the program source
code PS, which should be available to developers. Thus,
the input is <C,PS >.
Outputs: RES produces a set of execution traces Ti
that end with the program counter found in the core-
dump; corresponding to each instruction trace, a partial
memory image Mi (§2.3) is also provided, representing
the content of the program’s address space just before the
execution of the suffix—executing Ti starting with state
Mi leads to a state compatible with the coredump. The
execution suffix Ti consists of the inputs (e.g., system call
returns) and the thread schedule required to accomplish
this. To replay a suffix in a debugger like gdb, a special
environment is slipped underneath the debugger to in-
stantiate Mi and replay Ti; to the developer it looks as if
the program deterministically runs into the same failure.
RES continues building up suffixes by moving back-
ward through the execution until the user stops it. If al-
lowed to run to completion, RES would eventually either
reconstruct a full start-to-finish execution path, or con-
clude that no such path exists and therefore the coredump
is likely due to hardware failure.
2.2 The Challenge of Inferring the Past
RES requires moving backward in time through the un-
known execution that led to the failure. One thought
might be to reverse the outcome of every instruction,
but this is not feasible. For example, reversing a mem-
ory write in the general case requires knowledge of
what value was in that location prior to the execution of
the overwriting instruction. Further aspects that pertain
mostly to CISC instruction sets like x86 make the revers-
ing of other instructions hard as well. A method has been
proposed for reverse-executing programs running on the
RISC PowerPC [1], but even this method needed heavy-
weight recording to recover missing information.
The main challenge then is how to accurately recon-
struct past program state without having recorded it.
Prior work based on static analysis can compute back-
ward program slices [20, 26] or derive weakest precon-
ditions [7, 10] for given vulnerabilities. These techniques
are typically imprecise, as they do not use the rich source
of information present in the coredump. They also work
only on sequential programs, because reasoning stati-
cally about concurrent executions is very hard.
2
Execution sux being
incrementally inferred
buffer[y] = 1;
x = 1;
f(x) == y
x = 2;
g(x) == y
False True
Coredump memory:
x = 1;
y = 10;
False True
(buffer overflow)
P
re
d
P
re
d
Symbolic 
snapshot S
Symbolic 
snapshot S
c      λ    
concrete
symbolic
1 2
??
1 2
Figure 1: Simplified example illustrating the basics of
RES on a program that crashed due to a buffer overflow.
RES creates symbolic snapshots S1 and S2 that corre-
spond to program state just prior to each possible pre-
decessor basic block. Since x = 1 in the coredump, and
only Pred1 ever sets x to 1, then Pred1 must be part of
the correct execution suffix; RES discards the execution
suffix that traverses Pred2. A symbolic snapshot con-
tains both concrete and symbolic memory (e.g., x has an
unconstrained symbolic value in S1 because Pred1 over-
writes x’s value, so x prior to Pred1 could be anything).
2.3 Symbolic Snapshots
RES combines precise dynamic symbolic analysis with
static information from the coredump and the control-
flow graph of the program to reconstruct missing infor-
mation. Unlike forward execution synthesis, where the
static analysis phase goes from the final state all the way
to the start state before engaging in dynamic analysis,
RES alternates between static and dynamic analysis for
each basic block, incrementally producing a precise ex-
ecution suffix. Because RES focuses both static and dy-
namic analysis on an execution suffix—which is substan-
tially shorter than the length of the entire execution—it
alleviates the path explosion problem of forward execu-
tion synthesis approaches.
RES starts from the coredump and navigates P’s
control-flow graph backward until it reaches a basic
block that has at least two predecessors (Pred1 and Pred2
in Figure 1). At this point, RES determines statically
which predecessors are possible, and infers P’s memory
state just prior to executing each predecessor block.
To do this, RES creates symbolic snapshots (S1 and
S2 in Figure 1), one for each predecessor basic block.
A symbolic snapshot is a “hypothesis” of how program
state may have looked prior to executing that predeces-
sor block. It is an image of P’s memory state in which
some locations do not have concrete values, but rather
have stand-ins for any possible value (these are called
symbolic values [9]). Such symbolic values can also be
subject to constraints, such as having to be positive, or
being in a certain range. A symbolic snapshot in RES is
a mix of known, concrete values and currently unknown,
symbolic values. The program counter of a symbolic
snapshot is set to the entry point of the corresponding
predecessor basic block.
2.4 Reconstructing Program State
A symbolic snapshot Spre can be thought of as an over-
approximation of all possible program states just prior to
executing the predecessor block B. At a high level, the
idea is that, if Spost is the program state after executing
B, then we can obtain Spre from Spost by simply replacing
every memory location overwritten by B with an uncon-
strained symbolic value.
If we now execute B with Spre as a starting state, B will
transform Spre into S′, a more constrained version of the
symbolic snapshot Spre. This is because, as B executes,
it overwrites values in Spre with values computed either
based on other values in Spre (which may be concrete or
symbolic) or based on program inputs. For example, a
variable zmay be unconstrained prior to executing B, but
be constrained to z ∈ [0,10] after some arithmetic per-
formed by B. Program inputs (e.g., incoming network
packets, reads from disk) are handed to the program as
unconstrained symbolic values, since these inputs refer
to system state that is not contained in program memory.
After executing the last instruction in B, RES com-
pares Spost and S′, to check if the resulting S′ is an over-
approximation of Spost, meaning that the value of every
location in Spost is a subset of the possible values of that
location in S′ (we denote this by S′ ⊃ Spost). If it is, then
the just-executed B is part of a feasible execution suf-
fix, because it transformed program state in a way that
is compatible with the post-B state. If S′ 6⊃ Spost, then it
means that B cannot be part of the suffix.
This reverse synthesis process is applied recursively to
B’s predecessor block(s), incrementally forming an exe-
cution suffix, one block at a time. The first step of RES is
the base case of the recursion, in which Spost is initialized
with a copy of the coredump C, and the first instance of
block B is the last basic block of the execution suffix.
When deriving Spre from Spost, the main challenge are
memory read and write operations. When encounter-
ing a memory write instruction in B, there is no way of
knowing what value was overwritten by the instruction,
so RES sets the corresponding location in Spre to an un-
constrained symbolic value. When encountering a mem-
ory read instruction in B, RES faces two options: If that
memory location will not be subsequently overwritten by
an instruction in B, then RES knows exactly what value
the read should return: the value is taken directly from
Spost. If, however, that memory location will be over-
written somewhere in the remaining part of B, then RES
cannot know what value resided there, so it returns from
the read an unconstrained symbolic value.
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Due to space constraints, we omit our preliminary
ideas on how to reconstruct thread schedules, how to exe-
cute reads and writes with symbolic addresses (pointers),
and how to handle function pointers.
Execution breadcrumbs: RES can benefit from core-
dumps augmentedwith runtime information that is cheap
to collect after the crash. For instance, existing er-
ror logs can provide RES with useful, coarse-grained
“breadcrumbs” of the execution trace. Another example
is the Last Branch Record (LBR) in Intel CPUs, which
stores the source and destination addresses of the last
16 branches with virtually no overhead. LBR provides
a precise execution suffix that can substantially trim the
search space in RES. The length of the trace provided
by LBR can be extended by configuring the hardware to
filter information that can be easily inferred offline (e.g.,
LBR could filter taken conditional branches, and RES
would use the CFG of the program to reverse engineer
the taken conditional branches).
3 Use Cases
We now present several use cases where employing re-
verse execution synthesis can help.
3.1 Triaging Bug Reports
Debugging in the large is hard, because the number of
deployed systems is big, and the sheer volume of bug
reports can be overwhelming [16]. In this context, ac-
curately and automatically prioritizing reports from mil-
lions of users is particularly difficult yet crucial in cutting
down the development costs.
The main challenge in bug triaging is that a single bug
can lead to different failures, and different bugs can lead
to the same failure point. The state of the art in triag-
ing bug reports is Windows Error Reporting (WER) [16].
Despite proving its utility in over ten years of operation,
WER relies on ad-hoc heuristics and the law of large
numbers. For instance, WER uses heuristics such as de-
prioritizing reports that suggest bugs in core OS code,
which is deemed to be correct. Thus, WER can incor-
rectly bucket up to 37% of the bug reports [16].
RES can complement WER by reconstructing the ex-
ecution suffix and more precisely identifying the root
cause of the failure. RES can process incoming bug re-
ports and triage them based on the execution suffix and
the likely root cause. Determining the root cause in the
general case is hard; however, in several cases it is possi-
ble. For example, RES can detect reads from freed mem-
ory, which are likely to generate failures with different
call stacks. A naive triaging technique that only looks
at the call stack in the coredump would classify these
failures in different buckets, while RES could improve
accuracy by triaging based on the root cause. Similarly,
a naive triaging might mis-triage bugs for which the root
cause is not in the functions on the call stack. To cope
with root causes that are hard to infer automatically, RES
can use human feedback: once developers find the root
cause of a failure, they can write RES annotations for the
particular root cause, which would help RES triage other
bug reports into the same bucket.
RES can also be used to classify bugs as exploitable.
For instance, say RES traces a failure to a buffer over-
flow and then further determines that the data copied
to the buffer was tainted by external data that could be
supplied by an attacker (e.g., a system call that reads
a network packet). Such a verdict would automatically
classify the bug as remotely exploitable and increase
the priority level for the bug report. However, without
RES, such a remotely exploitable bug, which typically
generates many different failures (all with different call
stacks), would be bucketed incorrectly (each failure in its
own bucket). This could (1) cause the exploit to fly under
the radar, because each instance of it would seem to be a
different bug, and (2) burden the developers who have to
inspect many buckets, all due in fact to the same bug.
3.2 Failures Caused by Hardware Errors
Hardware errors are common, correlated, and recur-
rent [22]. Machines that crash once due to a hardware
error are two orders of magnitude more likely to crash
a second time [22]. Moreover, hardware errors generate
noise, and developerswaste time debugging them instead
of filtering them out. RES could be used to reduce this
significant source of noise.
It is difficult to distinguish a hardware error from
a software error, because both can manifest in similar
ways. In some simple cases, as with machine check ex-
ception (MCE) CPU errors, it is easy to diagnose a hard-
ware error. However, in other cases, such as memory er-
rors, one cannot reliably differentiate between a software
error (e.g., memory corruption) and a multi-bit DRAM
failure or DMA writes from a faulty device.
Prior work [22] used manual post-hoc analysis to iden-
tify likely hardware failures in the CPU subsystem, one-
bit memory flips, and disk system failures. These are
cases in which manual analysis is easy. For instance,
CPU errors are the ones that trigger an MCE and checks
for one-bit memory flips are limited to the kernel image,
which is meant to be read-only and can be compared to
the vanilla kernel image.
The open question that could be solved with RES is
how to automate this manual process and extend it to
more challenging cases (e.g., for memory that is not read-
only). For instance, while analyzing a coredump, RES
can discover inconsistencies between the coredump and
the execution of the program prior to generating the core-
dump, indicating that the likely explanation is a hardware
error. One example are memory errors: if on all the pos-
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sible paths to the coredump the program writes the value
1 to a certain memory address, but the coredump con-
tains the value 0, this would likely indicate a memory
error. Another example are CPU errors: say the CPU
miscomputed an addition, and this led to a crash. If RES
retrieves the result and the operands from the coredump,
and on all possible suffixes it obtains a different result for
the addition, it concludes the likely explanation for this is
a hardware error. Of course, diagnosing a hardware error
with full accuracy requires exploring all possible execu-
tion suffixes; this may be possible for short suffixes.
3.3 Debugging
RES enables several debugging aids on top of traditional
debuggers like gdb: synthesizing the execution suffix,
reconstructing past state (the symbolic snapshots), and
the ability to do reverse debugging without the need to
record the execution. Moreover, since it computes the
read and write sets of the execution suffix, RES automat-
ically focuses developers’ attention on the recently read
or written state, which, for debugging, is more likely to
be important than the rest of the coredump.
RES could also be used to automate the testing of var-
ious hypotheses formulated during debugging, such as
“what was the program state when the program was ex-
ecuting at program counter X ,” or “was a thread T pre-
empted before updating shared memory locationM?”
Since RES reproduces the coredump, it is not re-
stricted to a particular type of bugs—even semantic bugs
(e.g., captured by assert statements) can be reproduced.
4 Preliminary Prototype
We are in the early stages of implementing a prototype
of RES for LLVM [18] binaries (e.g., generated from
C/C++ source code). RES supports multi-threaded pro-
grams and is implemented on top of the Cloud9 [8] sym-
bolic execution engine. Currently, RES assumes sequen-
tial memory consistency when synthesizing execution
suffixes, but we plan to lift this limitation.
We evaluated RES on three synthetic concurrency
bugs. The root cause of these bugs were data races or
atomicity violations. In all the cases RES was able to
identify the correct root cause in less than 1 minute. RES
only produced execution suffixes that reproduced the cor-
rect root cause, therefore it had no false positives.
5 Related Work
!exploitable [21] is a debugging tool that assigns ex-
ploitability ratings to crashes. !exploitable uses heuris-
tics, and unfortunately this can lead to both false posi-
tives and false negatives. By providing an execution suf-
fix, RES can improve the accuracy of this classification.
In some sense, RES is like computing weakest pre-
conditions [13] for the coredump (i.e., the coredump can
be seen as an extraordinarily large postcondition). Inter-
procedural weakest precondition computation is hard for
imperative programs. The state-of-the art weakest pre-
condition computation tools [7, 10] do not work for con-
current programs, do not leverage the coredump, and as-
sume some level of recording [7]. The full use of the
coredump, the accurate memory handling, and the sup-
port for concurrent programs are RES’s key differentia-
tors from work on weakest precondition computation.
RES’s approach to executing symbolic snapshots
was inspired by UC-KLEE [24], which uses under-
constrained execution for equivalence checking.
6 Known Challenges
The main limiting factor for RES is the size of the exe-
cution suffix. If the root cause of the failure is far from
the failure, or the failure requires reproducing complex
thread schedule interleavings, RES will encounter the
unavoidable path explosion problem [6].
There are cases in which reversing executions requires
inverting a difficult code construct (e.g., a hash func-
tion or a cryptographic function). RES, as described,
might not be able to produce a suffix that goes beyond
the difficult code construct. However, such code con-
structs may be regenerated otherwise, e.g., the inputs to
the hash functionmay still be on the stack and RES could
re-execute the function instead of reverse-analyzing it.
RES may not always identify the exact root cause
that led to the observed failure, therefore it may not of-
fer debug determinism [27]. However, RES’s accuracy
promises to be good, mainly owing to the fact that any
execution suffix must match the full coredump exactly.
Typically, even small deviations from the real execution
suffix lead to a different coredump. Furthermore, one
could argue that every root cause of a failure should be
fixed; after fixing it, RES can be run again to identify the
other root cause, and so on until all root causes are fixed.
RES does not currently handle control flow through
invalid pointers andmemory or stack corruption, because
these cases may cause the CFG of the program to also
be corrupted, and the current RES prototype requires an
accurate CFG and stack.
7 Conclusion
We argued that it is conceivable to automate the debug-
ging of failures that occur in production systems, with-
out having to resort to runtime recording. We proposed
an initial design for reverse execution synthesis, which
takes as input a program and a coredump, and outputs
the suffix of an execution that leads that program to
that coredump. With this approach we hope to improve
a wide range of debugging-related tasks, such as auto-
matic triaging of bug reports, identifying failures caused
by hardware faults, and automating debugging processes
that are human labor-intensive.
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